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AIRPLANE NOISE: A TAKING WITHOUT
COMPENSATION?
Batten v. United States
306 F.2d 580 (1962)
Plaintiffs, who are property owners residing near Forbes Air Force Base,
commenced an action against the United States under the Tucker Act' to
recover for an alleged taking of property without compensation in violation
of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs had
purchased their lots and erected homes after the base had been deactivated,
but subsequently the base was reopened and enlarged to accommodate jets.
The property was outside the flying pattern of all aircraft operating at the
base.
The complaints arose from aircraft operations on the base. After trial,
the district court found the following facts which are not disputed. The
operation and maintenance of military jet aircraft produced noise, vibrations,
and smoke which the plaintiffs claimed interfered with the use and enjoy-
ment of their property; RB-47 and B-47 jet aircraft operated all six engines
for 30 minutes on a parking ramp which is 650 feet from plaintiffs' property
at its nearest point; at a warm up pad, 2000 feet from plaintiffs' property,
the engines were run at idling speed during final pre-flight checks; about
one-half of the flights began at a point 2,280 feet from the nearest property
of the plaintiffs where the engines were operated at maximum output for
30 seconds; during seven months of the year a water-alcohol injection sys-
tem was used on the jets and this system increased the characteristic trial
of black smoke left by the jets; maintenance work was done 3,420 feet
from the plaintiffs' property and the engines were operated at power settings
of from 50% to 100%;3 power generators on the parking ramp were run
from 8 to 10 hours during the day and sometimes at night. These activities
produced shock and sound waves which caused vibrations, making windows
and dishes rattle, made conversation and use of the telephone, radio, and
television facilities frequently impossible, and also interrupted sleep; and
black smoke emitted from the jets on take-off left oily black deposits on the
houses and laundry of the plaintiffs.
The case was based upon the Tucker Act which provides that claims
against the United States may be founded "upon the Constitution . . . or
1 36 Stat. 1093 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1958).
2 Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (1962). The court of appeals had previously
remanded the case so that the district court could make findings of fact. The district
court had granted the government's motion to dismiss after withholding its ruling until
after trial and accepted the facts established in the plaintiffs' complaint. See Batten
v. United States, 292 F.2d 144 (1961).
3 Id. at 582. "During engine operation in the 100% range the sound pressure level
measured in decibels varies from 90 to 117 on the plaintiffs' properties. Ear plugs are
recommended for Air Force personnel when the sound pressure reaches 85 decibels and
are required at or above 95 decibels."
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upon any express or implied contract with the United States. . . " The
statute also provides for damage claims in cases not sounding in tort.4 This
statute is a fulfillment of the obligation imposed on the government by the
fifth amendment of the Constitution which forbids "private property to
be taken for public use without just compensation." 5
The court of appeals, in this case of first impression, affirmed the district
court and denied recovery on the ground that the plaintiffs did not prove a
direct physical invasion of their property. 6 The court explained that harm
alone is not enough, otherwise the "carefully preserved distinction" between
"damage" and "taking" would be obliterated.7 It is true that this distinction
can be seen in the comparison of the fifth amendment with many state
constitutions which provide for compensation for property taken or
damaged, 8 but it is questionable whether it has really been carefully pre-
served in the federal courts.
Not every harm caused to a landowner by the government must be
compensated. The government activity is presumptively useful, and the
government should not be burdened with claims for insignificant harm to
every trifling interest which may be asserted. But these plaintiffs had clearly
experienced severe damage to their recognized right to enjoy their property
without unreasonable interference from others. This is the interest usually
4 Supra note 1.
5 The cause of action seemingly might fall under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
60 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(2)(b), §§ 2671-2678, § 2680 (1958). The act
covers Air Force personnel acting in the line of duty by its express terms and by inter-
pretation. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), is authority for the interpretation that the act does
not extend to the tort of nuisance. 91 C.J.S. United States 139. The Dalehite case did
not deal with nuisance either specifically or indirectly so such interference springs solely
from obiter dicta. Furthermore, the interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act
is of questionable validity because of inroads into its doctrine by subsequent cases.
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, supra; Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315
(1956). The act requires either "negligence or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the government acting within the scope of his employment . . . ." 60 Stat. 843
(1946), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2) (b) (1958). The cases uniformly require that negligence
be a factor on which liability may be predicated. Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
supra; Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, supra; Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d
819 (1958); Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 253 F.2d 716 (1958). The activity
in the principal case is not negligent. However, it could be argued that it was a "wrong-
ful act" within the meaning of the statute. But an exception denies recovery on that
basis because the provisions do not apply to "any claim based upon the act ...of an
employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation . . . ." 60 Stat. 845 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1958).
6 The court found authority for their general proposition in Transportation Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
7 Batten v. United States, supra note 2, at 584, citing Nunnally v. United States,
239 F.2d 521 (1956).
8 E.g., Ohio Constitution, Art. I, § 1 and § 19. Kansas does not have such a pro-
vision.
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protected by the law of nuisance. Their claim is surely not within the scope
of any principle of de minimis.
The concept of "taking" has not been rigidly confined to complete
confiscation. Landowners may be entitled to compensation even though they
are left with some nominal status as owners. The majority of the court had
some difficulty in distinguishing some of these cases and were forced to
concede that if the noise, shock waves, and smoke were intentionally directed
at the plaintiffs' property, a taking could be said to exist.9 But no reason is
suggested as to why the intention or state of mind of the government officials
should control the right of the individuals to compensation when the public
benefits at his expense.
The majority also suggested that a taking might have been recognized
if the plaintiffs' home had been rendered totally uninhabitable.' 0 This is
also a doubtful distinction. Doubtless many would regard the plaintiffs'
homes as being uninhabitable, as reflected in the proved depreciation in
values. If all were unanimous on the point, the taking would still not be
completely confiscatory, because the owners would be free to put the property
to other uses or to hope that the houses may be occupiable as residences
in the distant future. A similar plaintiff who had chosen to live on property
best suited to industrial use might suffer less harm than these plaintiffs, but,
nevertheless, be allowed relief upon application of this test. Such a result
makes little sense.
Most difficult to distinguish were the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Causby v. United States" and Griggs v. Allegheny
County.'2 In these cases, the Court held that there had been physical in-
vasions by airplane overflights. The damage to the plaintiffs was occasioned
by noise and vibration. The overflights were a trespass as well as a nui-
sance,' 3 but in the Causby case, the Court stated that flights over private
land were not takings, unless so low and so frequent as to be a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.' 4 Thus, no
taking could exist unless a substantial nuisance was created imposing a
servitude on the property. The property right protected was the same right
to peaceful enjoyment.
In assessing the harm, the court in the Causby case stated: "The
noise is startling. . . . As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up
their chicken business . . . (and) are frequently deprived of their sleep."'15
9 Supra note 2, at 585.
10 Ibid.
11 328 U.S. 256 (1945).
12 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
13 Trespass cases have extended to instances of shooting across land. Whittaker
v. Strangvick, 100 Minn. 386, 111 N.W. 295 (1907); Hall v. Browning, 195 Ga. 423,
24 S.E.2d 392 (1943). Invasion by smoke has been characterized historically as a
nuisance cause of action in tort. McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40,
81 N.E. 549 (1907).
14 Supra note 11, at 266.
15 Id. at 259.
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Similarly in the Griggs case, the court quoted the Board of Viewers of the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas by saying that the noise of the air-
planes was comparable "to the noise of a riveting machine or steam hammer"
on take-off and comparable "to that of a noisy factory" on let-down.16 In
addition, the court's opinion quotes a dissenting opinion from the state
supreme court as a summary of the uncontroverted facts as follows; "[I]t
was often impossible for people in the house to converse or talk on the tele-
phone. The plaintiff and members of his household (depending on the flight
which in turn sometimes depended on the wind) were frequently unable to
sleep even with ear plugs and sleeping pills; they would frequently be
awakened by the flights and the noise of the planes; the windows of their
home would frequently rattle and at times plaster fell down from the walls
and ceilings .... ,,17
Despite the striking similarity in the extent and nature of the harm
experienced by the present plaintiffs with those in the Causby and Griggs
cases, the court distinguished them on the basis of the trespassory overflight.
The trespass was a direct displacement of the landowner and compensable
whereas the nuisance was indirect and not compensable. The forms of action
distinction between trespass and trespass on the case are thus embalmed as
the fifth amendment and the Tucker Act. The distinction is clearly unsatis-
factory.
Surely most takings involve an actual physical invasion.' 8 But recovery
has been permitted in several instances where no physical invasion occurred
where the taking was accomplished by indirect non-trespassory interference. 9
It surely cannot be said that the overflight in Causby in and of itself caused
the injury. It is the injury occasioned by noise, vibration, etc. resulting from
the overflight which is the basis for finding a constitutional taking. Exactly
the same injury of noise, vibrations, and smoke is found in the principal
case and other non-physical invasion cases.
The economic interest asserted here is identical with that taken in the
physical invasion cases like Causby and Griggs, and the means by which the
interest is taken are no different. That the interference comes from a
vertical direction rather than a lateral one should surely be a matter of
indifference to a fairly administered scheme of compensation.2 0
16 Supra note 12, at 87.
17 Ibid.
18 Numerous cases are included in Chief judge Murrah's dissenting opinion, supra
note 2, at 586.
19 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 90 (1960) (lien destruction); Richards v.
Washington Terminal, 233 U.S. 546 (1913) (smoke and gases); Thomburg v. Port of
Portland, 376 P.2d 105 (1962). In the latter case, the Oregon Supreme Court supported
the dissenting opinion in the principal case although the case was remanded to send
the question of taking to the jury. The alleged taking involved nuisances from airport
operations without substantial direct overflights.
20 "The compensable 'taking' in an action initiated by the landowner consists
not in an appropriation of the landowner's property in a zone or column of airspace but
rather in the creation of noise which substantially interferes with surface use and enjoy-
[Vol. 24
1963] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 583
It must be conceded that a line must be drawn somewhere and that it
will be necessarily arbitrary with respect to some close cases. But the prob-
lem involved with defining the limits of recovery are no more difficult than
those in numerous nuisance cases. The interference should be more incon-
sequential before society should dismiss the claims of the individual as a
trifling burden to be borne as a cost of civilization.
ment." "Airplane Noise: Problems in Tort Law and Federalism," 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1581
(1961) at 1585. See also Hayes, "United States v. Causby: An Extension Thereof."
3 Win. & M. L. Rev. 36 (1961) at 49.
